We are pleased to announce that the chapter “Undermining Judicial Independence” written by Mauro Arturo Rivera Leon, PhD was published in the monograph “Judicial Independence in Transitional Democracies”.
This chapter examines the negative implications of perceived control of chief justices to judicial independence through a case study of Chief Justice Zaldívar’s presidency in Mexico.
By examining the Mexican case, this study further sheds light on the relationship between court presidents and political branches, highlights the attempts of the latter to exert control over the judiciary, and contributes to the understanding of chief justices in Latin America, where they face increasing pressure from populist politics.
The book “Judicial Independence in Transitional Democracies” presents interdisciplinary and comparative analyses of judicial independence in transitional democracies across Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. This book examines factors that drive de jure and de facto judicial independence in transitional democracies and evaluates their relationship. In doing so, it identifies challenges and opportunities associated with developing judicial independence in transitional democracies.
