Supermajority voting rules in constitutional courts are often framed as a tool for judicial restraint, but critics worry they actually clear the path for democratic backsliding.
It is argued that requiring a supermajority weakens a court’s ability to resist illiberal reforms. But looking at cases in Mexico (2024), the Philippines (1973), and Peru (1997), the story is more complex.
New research shows that supermajority rules don’t cause backsliding in a vacuum. Want to dive deeper into how courts navigate authoritarian threats? Read the full article written by Mauro Arturo Rivera León, PhD, DLitt to explore how Mexico, the Philippines, and Peru reveal the mechanics behind judicial supermajorities and democratic backsliding.
Full article is available here: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642987.2026.2711681
